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NATURE OF THE CASE 
The city, by ordinance, restricted to four the number 
of all beer licenses and refused without other cause to issue 
a Class A license to plaintiff for sale of beer in original 
containers for off-premise consumption in its combination 
grocery store-gasoline station. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss 
with prejudice without other pleadings or trial (R. 59). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a decree from this court reversing 
the order of dismissal of t~e trial court, and adjudging that 
in absence of cause found to be within the police power of 
the city, the plaintiff is entitled to be issued a Class A beer 
license. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
Plaintiff's complaint alleged in part as follows: 
3. Pla~ntiff operates a business at 195 South 
Highway 89-91 within the city limits of said 
municipality consisting generally of the retail 
sale of gasoline, other petroleum products, 
groceries and food items under license issued by 
said municipality. Prior to September 5, 1978, 
plaintiff duly applied and tendered the fee for 
a Class A retail license to sell beer on said 
premises at 195 South Highway 89-91 in original 
containers for consumption off the premises. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 2 -
The defeGdants declined to issue the license 
for the reasons set forth in a letter dated 
September 6, 1978, from the Honorable Robert 
Palmquist, Mayor of North Salt Lake Corporation 
which stated: ' 
1
'D. J . Allred 
598 West 2600 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dear Mr. Allred: 
Your application for a retail beer license 
to sell beer at Triangle Oil Inc., 195 South 
Highway 89, was reviewed by the City Council 
at their regularly scheduled meeting on 
September 5, 1978. Due to the size of North 
Salt Lake and to the fact that there are now 
seven active beer licenses in the city, the 
council voted unanimously to disapprove your 
request. Their action in no way reflects 
upon you or your business. It merely reflects 
the council 1 s feelings that there are now 
sufficient beer outlets within the city. 
Sincerely, 
Robert Palmquist 
Mayorn 
4. Ordinance No. 77-8 enacted by de~endants on 
December 20, 1977, which became effective December 
20, 1977, is entitled, AN ORDINANCE REPEALING AND 
REENACTING CHAPTER 9 OF TITLE 4 OF THE CITY CODE 
OF NORTH SALT LAKE TO PROVIDE FOR THE SALE, REGU-
LATION, LICENSING AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE SALE OF 
BEER. Section 4-9-2 thereof provides: 
n4-9-2. LICENSE TO SELL LIGHT BEER AT RETAIL. 
It shall be unalwful for any person to engage 
in the business of the sale of light beer at 
retail, in bottles, other orginal containers, 
or draft, within the corporate limits of the 
city without first having procured a license 
therefor from the council as hereinafter 
provided. A separate license shall be required 
for each place of sale and the license shall at 
all times be conspicuously displayed in the 
place to which it shall refer or for which it 
l 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 3 -
shall be issued. All licenses shall comply 
with the Liquor Control Act of Utah and the 
regulations of 0he liquor control commission 
and every license shall recite that it is 
granted subject to revocation as hereinafter 
provided." 
The complaint also alleged that: 
The said enabling statute does not provide that the 
city may restrict the number of licenses issued nor 
does it mention the sale ofbeer in "other original 
containers!!, but mentions only sale at retail, in 
bottles or draft. 
Accordingly, the city is without right or 
authority to enact an ordinance which restricts 
the number of licenses issued and endeavors to 
control sale of beer in cans or other original 
containers except bottle or draft. 
Section 4-9-3 of the city ordinance provides 
in part: 
"4-9-3. LICENSE PRIVILEGES. 
A. Retail licenses issued hereunder shall be 
of the following· kinds and shall carry the 
following privileges and be numbered numeri-
cally commencing from the number one: 
1. Class "A" retail license shall entitle 
the licensee to sell beer on the licensed 
premises in original containers for 
consumption off the premises in accordance 
with the Liquor Control Act of Utah and 
the ordinances of the city." 
Section 4-9-11 relates to restriction of numbers of licenses 
to be issued and provides: 
ITJ. The total number of businesses licensed to 
sell beer in the city of North Salt Lake Shall not 
exceed four, provided that this ordinan~e shall 
not operate to reduce the number of businesses 
now licensed to sell beer whether issued by 
this municipality of by the county if such 
business is annexed, nor shall it affect 
reapplications for such licenses." 
The restriction does not appear in any enabling statute; 
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it does not distinquish between licenses for sale 
of beer for consumption off the premises under '.::las3 
A license from sale of beer for consumption en the 
premises under a Class B license or consumption ~n 
the premises with the sale of meals under a Class 
C license. 
The restriction of Class A licenses in not within 
the power or authority of the defendants and has no 
legal relationship to the police power of the city. 
The trial court considered the written memoranda of the 
parties and ordered that the complaint be "dismissed with 
prejudice, failure to state a claim". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. CITY HAS NO POWER TO RESTRICT THE 
NUMBER OF CLASS A BEER LICENSES 
WITHOUT PROOF OF NECESSITY THEREFOR 
IN EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. 
Plaintiff operates one of its "Gas 'n Groceries" store 
at North Salt Lake and applied for a Class A beer license ~i~ 
would have permitted plaintiff to sell beer in original con-
tainers for consumption off the premises. Defendant city 
council refused to issue a license for the sole stated.reason 
that there were presently sufficient beer outlets within the 
city. The city ordinance fixes the number of businesses 
licensed to sell beer at four without specifying any division 
among Classes A, B or C. Class B would allow consumption on 
the premises in containers or draft, and Class C allows 
similar consumption on premises only in connection witr. the 
sale of meals. 
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Plaintiff contends that city has no power to restrict 
the number of Class A beer licenses for the reason that such 
power has not been invested in the city by statute; that any 
power to regulate must have an intimate relationship to the 
public health, welfare or morals based upon evidence and facts; 
and that the provision allowing a reapplication by the same 
licensee for one of the restricted licenses is invalid. 
Historically, the laws of Utah, 1935, Section 89, vested 
the Liquor Control Commission with authority to grant licenses 
to sell light beer at retail for off premises consumption and 
draft on premises. Section 91 established a limitation on the 
number of licenses for sale of light beer on draft according 
to population, but made no restriction on licensing for sale 
of beer in containers for off premise consumption. The laws 
of 1937 changed the act to allow licensing by cities under 
language as follows: 
32-4-17. Light beer-Sales to minors. (a) Cities 
and towns within their corporate limits, and counties 
outside of incorporated cities and towns shall have 
power to licen$e, tax, regulate or prohibit the sale 
of light beer, at retail, in bottles or draft; 
provided, that no such licP.nses shall be granted 
to sell beer in any dance hall, theater or in the 
proximity of any church or school. The commission 
granting the license shall have authority to 
determine in each case what shall constitute 
proximity. 
The words "license", "tax" and "regulate" are the identical 
words used in 10-8-39 which authorizes cities to license certain 
businesses. The word "prohibit" is used in 10-8-42 which dates 
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back to 1898 and this section reads: 
10-8-42. Intoxicating liquors-Regulation. Tl'.e:/ 
may prohibit, except as provided by law, any person 
from knowlingly having in his possession any 
intoxicating liquor, and the manufacture, sale, 
keeping or storing for sale, offering or exposing 
for sale, importing, carrying, transporting, 
advertising, distributing, giving away, exchanging, 
dispensing or serving of intoxicating liquors. 
Thus .32-4-17 added nothing by way of power of cities to prohik I 
sales since this authority to prohibit under 10-8-42 
I 
antedates I 
the former. The authority to limit Class A licenses must be I 
found apart from the right to prohibit. Does the word "regula) 
I 
give such authority to restrict the number? Appellant contends 
it would do so only to the extent the city reasonably finds it 
necessary in exercise of its police power. The sale of beer 
in original containers for off premise consumption is not a 
nuisance per se, nor an evil recognized by statute or otherwise 
as requiring restriction. This is borne out by at least the 
following facts: 
(1) The ordinance itself defines "nuisance" 
under 5 categories, none of which includes Class A 
situations. 
(2) The Liquor Control Act, .32-1-2, defines 
police power as it relates to liquor in controlling 
saloons and unlawful selling: 
32-1-2. This act shall be deemed an exercise 
of the police powers of the state for the pro-
tection of the public health, peace and morals; 
to prevent the recurrence of abuses associated 
with saloons; to eliminate the evils of unlicenses 
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and unalwf~l manufacture, selling and disposing 
of alcoholic beverages; and all provisions of 
this act shall be liberally construed for the 
attairunent of these purposes. 
(3) It is not unlawful to drink alcohol and 
even to drive a vehicle if the amount of alcohol in the 
blood is .05 percent or less, which would be at least 
two bottles of beer (41-6-44). 
(4) Acts characterized as evil or immoral as 
a matter of religion are not necessarily evil or immoral 
as a matter of law. 
We acknowledge the right of the state to restrict 
licensing and withhold licensing without the necessity of giving 
any reason therefor. And, if specifically legislated, the state 
could authorize the limiting or restricting of licenses by 
cities. However, in absence of statute the city has no such 
right. This is set forth in the annotations in 163 ALR 581 from 
which we quote on page 582 as follows: 
Municipalities, too, when they are invested by 
state legislatures with the power to do so, may 
limit the number of liquor licenses which may be 
issued within their jurisdictions. State ex rel. 
Dixie Inn v. Miami (Fla) (reported herwith) ante, 
577; Hall v. Kewanee (1942) 379 Ill 176, 39 NE2d 
1009; Alamogordo Improv. Co. v. Prendergast (1940) 
45 NM 40, 109 P2d 254; State ex rel. Saperstein v. 
Bass (1941) 177 Tenn 609, 152 SW2d 236. 
But it seems that municipal control may be 
superseded by a state beverage act which d?es 
not limit the number of licenses anywhere in 
the state, and reserves to municipalities only 
the right to enact ordinances regulating the 
hours of business and the location of places of 
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business, and prescribing sani~ary conditions. 
City of Miami v. Kichinko (1945) Fla 22 So2d 
627, 630. In this case the ccurt held invalid 
an ordinance which limited the number of lquor 
licenses according to population. 
Since 32-4-17 utilizes the words license, tax and 
regulate similarly as contained in the licensing power of citi< 
under 10-8-39, we analyze some cases dealing with the word 
"regulate" in connection with the latter. 
In Salt Lake Citz v Revene (1942) 124 P2d 537' where 
the city sought to limit the hours which a barber shop could 
remain open in affirming the lower court in sustaining a 
demurrer to the complaint, Justice Wolfe wrote: 
[2] The municipality being a creature of the 
state delegated powers, the question arising here 
is whether this ordinance is within the police 
power delegated under Section 15-8-39; to nlicense, 
tax and regulate". 
[3 ,4] The word nregulate" is difficult to define 
in other terms because it involves a conception for 
which it stands more accurately than any synonym. 
It involves the making of a rule in reference to 
the subject to be regulated. Webster's Interna-
tional Distionary, (2nd Edition), defines the 
word to mean "to bring under the control of law 
or constituted authorityn. The rule making power 
given to cities in reference to barber shops does 
not mean any rule but such rules reasonably related 
and designed to protect the health of the public. 
In Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 P.530, 
532, 5 A.L.R. 960, this court after defining 
regulation, said, "the foregoing illustrations are 
quite sufficient to show that, where the power 
'to regulate' a particular calling or business is 
conferred on a city, it authorized such city to 
prescribe and enforce all such proper and reason-
able rules and regulations as may be deemed 
necessary and wholesome in conducting the business 
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in a proper and orderly manner." 
[5,6] The question resolves itself to this: 
Is the fixing of closing hours a reasonable 
regulation within the scope of the delegated 
police power, i.e. has it a reasonable rela-
tionship to the protection of health of the 
public? 
Apparently the court found as a matter of law that regulating 
the hours of barbers had no relation to public health. Like-
wise, it would appear to be equally a matter of law that the 
limiting of the number of Class A licenses has no relation to 
public health, since such beer could readily be purchased from 
other licensees in and about North Salt Lake. No one could 
prove that the health of residents of North Salt Lake would be 
effected whether there were 100 such licenses or none at all. 
Of course, the action of the city council in limiting 
licenses may be symbolic of the feelings of the council and many 
of their constituents that alcohol is evil and its use should 
be prohibited, however, this philosophy in a democracy should 
not be visited upon persons whose attitude toward moderate use 
of beeris that it is moral, lawful and less harmful than 
consumption of some softer beverages. 
POINT II. THIS ATTEMPT TO LIMIT CLASS A BEER 
LICENSES IS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE 
AND DISCRIMINATORY. 
Plaintiff's place of business is on U. S. Highway 91 
and is the last business location selling groceries and gasoline 
at the south end of the city. It is properly zoned for business. 
In Smith v. Barrett, 20 P2d 864, Utah (1933) it was 
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held that to attempt to limit gasoline service stations by 
requiring consent of adjoining property owners even though 
the property was within a zone allowing gas sta ti ems, ·l'las net 
allowable under the general welfare clause. A filling statio~. 
is not a nuisance per se even though it may be operated to 
become a public or private nuisance according to the opinion 
which quoted the following with approval: 
"Under the Constitution, arbitrary power cannot 
be conferred upon the city council in the exercise 
of the police power of any other power it possesses. 
A gasoline filling station, properly constructed 
and properly operated, is not per se a nuisance. 
The city council may by reasonable ordinances 
establish zoning districts or define how gas 
filling stations may be constructed and how 
operated. But arbitray power to allow a gas 
filling station on one man 1 s property and disallow 
it to another, without any definite rule by which 
the city council is to be ·governed, cannot be 
conferred, for this would be to give it power 
to deny equal rights to all the citizens." 
[7] Is it any less arbitrary, unreasonable, 
or discriminatory for a board of city commissioners 
to confer upon the owners of a specified foot 
frontage arbitrary power to allow a gas filling 
station on one man 1 s property and, by refusal 
of consent, disallow it to another, than for a 
Legislature to confer a like power upon a city 
commission without a definite rule by which such 
action should be governed? We observe none, and, 
further, find no such power conferred by statute 
in this state. 
The court further stated that such arbitrary power would deny 
equal rights to all citizens presumably under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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POINT III. WITHOUT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING A NEED 
TO RESTRICT THIS LICENSE THE ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL WAS ERROR. 
Justice Crockett, in the case of Ritholz v. City of 
Salt Lake, 3 U2d 385, Sec. 284 P2d 702, Utah (1955), where the 
city by ordinance prohibited the advertising of prices for 
eyeglasses, held that this was not within the powers granted 
cities nor was it authorized under general authority of l0-8-84 
to preserve the safety, health and morals of the city. The 
court stated that cities are creatures of statute and limited 
in powers to those delegated by the Legislature, which powers 
should be strictly construed. We quote in part from this 
opinion: 
"In this particular context the power to regulate 
business can mean only such regulations as are 
reasonably and substantially related to the safe-
guarding of the public health which raises the 
question whether the advertising proscribed by 
the ordinance bears such a relation. This 
involves consideration of the constitutional as 
well as the ultra vires problem since the city 
cannot be authorized to do what the legislature 
itself has not the power to do. 
To begin with, we observe that the city offered 
no evidence at the trial to show any relationship 
between advertising eyewear and public health. 
There is urged before us only conclusions of law 
made by other courts, preswnably upon the basis 
of some factual showing in each case. But we 
disregard this deficiency in the presentation of 
evidence and consider the contentions presented 
to us. 11 
I would appear from Justice Crockett's opinion that 
evidence would have to be produced to justify the exercise of 
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limi ta ti on which defendants seek to place upon Class A licensc: 3. 
We have reviewed 32-1-8 which delineates the subjec:s 
of regulation by the commission, and none of which seek to 
restrict licensing under the guise of regulation. Also a 
review of 10-8-43 through 10-8-46 with respect to power of 
cities to regulate certain businesses such as food markets, 
sale of food and plumbing functions indicates what the legisla-
ture had in mind in the use of the words "regulate" or 
"regulation". 
POINT DJ. BEER LICENSING IS ENTITLED TO THE 
SAME REASONABLE TREATMENT AS OTHER 
BUSINESSES. 
In the case of Anderson v. Utah County Board of Com-
missioners, (1979) 589 P2d 1214, this court stated: 
The same considerations of fundamental fairness 
and justice which prevent an administrative body 
from acting in a capricious or arbitrary manner 
in other areas of the law also apply in a beer 
license, even thougl. it is a business which is 
subjected to a high degree of supervision and 
regulation in the interest of the public welfare. 
This same Anderson case also held that a denial of an applicati:: 
for renewal of a Class B beer license to a tavern without prope; 1 
findings was error. Although the Anderson case held that in I 
support of the spirit of free enterprise an existing licensee 
should be given preference on renewals where his business is 
found upon such license as in the case of a Class B license 
for a tavern, yet with respect to Class A licenses for grocery 
stores, if any authority to limit exists, these should be 
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rotated since beer is only one item of many upon which the 
grocery business is founded and while not critical to continued 
existence of the grocery store, it is a marked advantage which 
should not be perpetuated in monopoly. However, the proper 
perspective is to hold that there is no basis to limit, in 
the first place, the number of grocery stores with Class A 
licenses. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiff's 
complaint should be reversed and the cause remanded to the 
District Court to order the defendant city to issue a Class A 
license to plaintiff in absence of reasonable evidence 
supporting a need for restriction of Class A beer licenses 
within the city in the proper exercise of its police power. 
submitted, 
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